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Exploding the 1950s Consumer Dream: Mannequins and Mushroom Clouds at 
Doom Town, Nevada Test Site 
 
JOHN WILLS 
The author is a member of the history department at the University of Kent. 
While the mushroom cloud rising above the Nevada desert is an iconic and familiar 
image, what went on beneath the cloud is hazier and less well understood. Surface 
level nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s entailed extensive scientific, 
military and social experiments. This article focuses on two projects overseen by 
the Federal Civil Defence Administration (FCDA), Doom Town I and II, and their 
ties with 1950s cultural values and the consumer landscape. It situates the two 
mock American townscapes as part of the cultural battlefield of the Cold War, and 
explores how they served as powerful but also deeply flawed symbols of American 
capitalism and a new suburban way of life.  
 
 
On May 5, 1955, over 100 million Americans watched Doom Town, a mock 
American townscape assembled at the Nevada Test Site, explode live on 
television.  On July 17, 1955, around 90 million witnessed the grand unveiling of 
Disneyland across the state line in Anaheim, California live on ABC television.  
The broadcasts of both the nuclear test and the theme park opening proved 
bungled affairs.  Weather delays frustrated the nuclear detonation of Apple 2 and 
the accompanying Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) initiative 
Operation Cue that included Doom Town.  Postponed five times, a riled press 
declared ǲǯ ?-million-dollaǮǯǳ ǲthe biggest ǳand retitled the event Ǯ-ǯ.1  Detonated 
ten days late, the device released radioactive clouds that engulfed the fake 
suburbia, thwarting media photography and preventing pictures of the town-
site.  At Disneyland, an extremely hot day combined with water shortages and a 
gas leak in Fantasyland hampered visitor experience.  Traffic congestion delayed 
the arrival of special guests.  Sprinklers misfired onto Davy Crockett, while unset 
asphalt ǯ.  Cast members referrǮǯǤ Both carefully planned and orchestrated televisual events went ǮǯǤ 
 
Disneyland and Doom Town may seem polar opposites, but the places share 
much in common. Both functioned as propaganda landscapes of the 1950s: 
patriotic, Cold War performative architecture, assembled with a white middle 
class audience in mind, and molded into media spectacle for a new televisual 
nation.  Both served as bunkers sheltering people from the perils of nuclear 
conflict: Disneyland offering a colorful escape to Never, Never Land, while Doom 
Town pointed to survival through sanctuaries at home.  Most significantly, Doom 
Town and Disneyland sold concepts of reassurance, national pride, and self-
reliance through the template of the 1950s consumer dream.  John Findlay Ǯǯǡǲǳǲǳ 
post-1945 hopes and values; the same could be said of Doom Town.2  Creative 
geographies extolling the wonders of American capitalism, the two landscapes 
provided models of white middle-class affluence. Both featured a Main Street, 
USA, celebrating the traditional ground zero of American commerce, and an 
artificial population of consumers (audio-animatronic figures at Disneyland, 
mannequins at Doom Town).  Both captured the postwar zeitgeist in their 
suburban outlook as well as their embracement of an atomic-shaped future.  
Disneyland and Doom Town operated as didactic landscapes based around 
material wealth. They sold stories of mass abundance, of a middle class lifestyle 
that could prosper even in the face of Armageddon.  
 
This article focuses on Doom Town as a consumer landscape.  Designed to 
bolster nationwide civil defense initiatives and increase public knowledge of 
nuclear danger, the FCDA constructed and subsequently destroyed two versions 
of Doom Town at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s: Doom Town I consisting of 
two suburban-type homes as part of Operation Doorstep during test Annie on 17 
March 1953 and Doom Town II a whole town-site including radio towers and 
public utilities, as part of Operation Cue during Apple 2 on 5 May 1955.  The 
Doom Town experiment offered a unique realization of the atomic home front. 
Part of the cultural battlefield of the Cold War, Doom Town served as a powerful 
symbol of American capitalism and venerated a new suburban way of life.  In ǮǯǡFCDA situated the atom 
firmly within a contemporary consumer landscape. Backed by corporate 
sponsors, the FCDA assembled ǮǤǯ  However, the destruction of 
these structures highlighted the vulnerability of the postwar dream, consumer 
culture and the potential futility of civil defense. The juxtaposition of modern life 
with atomic wasteland provoked a sense of horror in civilian onlookers, and 
questioned the notion of survivability in the nuclear age. Through the suburban 
ǡ	ǯ
backyard, but as a wholly negative force.  Rather than survival towns, they were 
labeled Ǯǯ of the period.  The projects reveal the challenges faced by 
the FCDA in promoting civil defense, and the limits of tying consumption with 
destruction. 
  
While the mushroom cloud rising above the Nevada desert is an iconic and 
familiar image, what went on beneath the cloud is hazier and less well 
understood. Surface level nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s 
entailed extensive scientific, military and social experiments overseen by a range 
of government agencies.  While A. Costandina Titus and Richard Miller have 
documented the broader test series, scholars are yet to consider individual 
experiments in detail.  Most tackle the workings of atomic culture on a broader 
level (Paul Boyer, Margot Henrikson, Scott Zeman), helping us to understand the 
spread of mass anxiety (Spencer Weart) or the Ǯmushroom 
cloudǯ itself (Scott Kirsch).  In the realm of civil defense, Lee Garrison, Kenneth 
Rose, Guy Oakes, Joseph Masco, and Laura McEnaney have explored some of the 
challenges faced by the FCDA.  In terms of Doom Town itself, Andrew Kirk has 
briefly looked at the imagery of the site, while Angela Moor mentions the open 
tests as part of her thesis on the promotion of civil defense, but how the specific 
project fits with FCDA policy, atomic culture or broader American values 
remains unclear.3 
 
Selling the Home Front 
 
Established by President Harry S. Truman in December 1950, the FCDA was 
charged with creating a national civil defense programme.  First FCDA director ǲǳ for the Cold War 
propelled by ǲǤǳ4  The 
message of early FCDA propaganda proved relatively simple: if Americans 
embraced the concept of civil defense, they could survive nuclear war.  While the 
US ǲǳ the 
perfect nuclear soldier, the FCDA strived toward its own civilian counterpart. 
The organization launched a range of leaflets, tours, and short films, hoping to 
mold the civilian into a dutiful participant in a new theater of conflict. The 
FCDAǯeport to Congress (1955) stressed the necessity of thorough ǲǳlurking ǲǳ or ǲǤǳ5  Unlike U.S. 
troops trained to take orders, the FCDA faced a public initially wary over 
involvement in defense matters. 
 
Operating within a constrained budget, the FCDA hoped to pass most of the 
responsibility for civil defense onto the individual, and encouraged a philosophy 
of self-help and civic duty compatible with time-honored American values.  
Hoping to win a nation over to its fledgling civil defense ideology, the 
Administration relied on modern sales techniques.  As McEnaney observed, the 	ǲǤǳThey also 
conceptualized the public as consumers.  A civil defense marketing framework 
combined notions of self-reliance and volunteerism with consumer choice.  For ǡǲ-help as the main policy of preparedness effectively ǤǳEarly rhetoric highlighted this 
amalgam process: a range of 1951 FCDA cards simply declared ǲǤǳ6 
 
The success of civil defense came to depend not just on the consumer, but also on 
the corporation.  Operating on a skeletal budget (in 1951, the FCDA received 
$65m from Congress rather than the $535m requested), the FCDA increasingly 
turned to corporate alliances and company sponsorship to function.  Exhibitions, 
brochures, and documentaries featured company branding.  In 1955, the agency 
statǣǲivil 
Defense Ǥǳ7  Co-operation fused civil defense (and atomic culture) with a 
pro-business, pro-consumer mentality.   Specific corporate alliances shaped civil 
defense content, strategy and rhetoric.  Sponsored by the Paint & Lacquers 
Association, ǮThe ǯ(1954) tied home decoration with 
holocaust survival.  Chrysler produced Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ that 
showed how private watercraft could be used to escape disaster. The Institute of 
Life Insurance-Ǯǯȋ ? ? ?5) analogized nuclear attack ǡǲǡǡǳ the day.  As FCDA director Millard Caldwell 
himself underlinǡǲǤǳ8  
 
Doom Town embodied the 	ǯconsumer and corporate turn.  Staff conceived 
Doom Town as the perfect platform to show and sell civil defense measures. 
Doom Town could highlight what kind of provisions, home fittings and shelters 
to buy in order to survive attack.  The project presented a unique public relations 
opportunity.  Employed by the FCDA to advise on how best to promote disaster 
ID tags for kids, Freeman Company suggested schoolchildren be sent to the Ǯǯ ? ? ? ?portunities to best capture their 
responses.9  Tapping contemporary preoccupations with suburban affluence, the 
FCDA transformed a deserted test site into a mannequin-populated town rich in 
consumer symbols and labels.  Mannequins sported the latest fashions while cars 
were of the latest design.  At Doom Town, the FCDA sold the issue of civil defense 
as a lifestyle choice, and transformed the threat of the bomb into a dark cloud 
hanging over suburbia.   
 
Out of patriotic duty, corporations volunteered their services. In its annual 
report to Congress for  ? ? ? ?ǡ	ǲǳǲǳǡǲ
prǳe policy.  ǲǳ
provided by Congress, the FCDA announced a strategy of ǲ 
promotion,ǳ whereby staff courted corporate America, inviting companies to 
assist with a range of civil defense projects.10  The National Lumber 
Manufacturers Association helped the FCDA construct ǲrican frame ǳat Doom Town I.11  North American Van Lines Inc. delivered test items 
free of charge to the site, while Atlas Furniture of Las Vegas contributed home 
furnishings.   ? ? ? ?ǲǡǳ
significantly in order to craft a much larger townscape for  ? ? ? ?ǯ
Cue.12  The list of collaborators expanded to include Airstream, Edison Electric, 
Ford, Kaiser Aluminum, Union Carbide, and Trans World Airlines.  Highlighting 
the new relationship between consumer capital and civil defense, some 150 
companies assisted in the process.  Doom Town represented a novel marketing 
opportunity.  Several of the industries sponsored both Doom Town and 
Disneyland, highlighting their desire to venture into all kinds of promotional 
landscapesǤǯ Tomorrowland featured ǯǯ Ǯ	ǯ mascot KAP the pig.   
 
Promoting Operation Cue, second FCDA director Val Peterson explained, ǲ
program this year is the participation of private industry,ǳ and related ǲǥor the whole-hearted cooperation and support of the many private 
industries, associations, Ǥǳ13 Industrial cooperation influenced the 
design of around half the technical projects.  Safety Appliances Company 
provided helmets for field exercise participants (dubbed Desert Rats) while JC 
Penney provided overalls - tǮǯtold to return home with their 
antics ǲǡǳǲn given to you by 	Ǥǳ14  Even airplanes were loaned.15  The Administration presented the 
corporate involvement as both necessary and mutually beneficial.  In return for 
equipment, the FCDA promised ǲǳǲǤǳ16  A corporate-
sponsored Armageddon landscape, Doom Town attested to an intriguing synergy 
between consumer culture and catastrophe culture.  Out in the desert, 
corporations helped the FCDA turn nuclear disaster into Ǯǯ
masses.  
 
The novelty of ǯDoom Towns appealed to the nation.  The media 
constructed Ǯresidentsǯ, highlighting both the fears and the 
fashion choices of mannequin denizens.  As if Doom Town was a real town, 
American Home, Good Housekeeping, and House and Garden magazines all 
covered its construction.  Ǯǯl 
as interior shots of the dwellings. Doom Town became a consumer-based news 
story.  Corporate sponsors advertised their own wares with reference to civil 
defense and atomic survival.  Welcoming the coverage, the FCDA hoped that the 
experiment would motivate people to defend their own consumer gains against 
Soviet attack and that Doom Town would serve as a ǲcue to survival.ǳ  The 





The Doom Town project reflected growing interest in home ownership, planned  ? ? ? ?ǤǮǯ
Doom Town, along with glitzy casino-hotels at Las Vegas and themed worlds at 
Disneyland, reflected a new dynamism in design taking hold in the urban West, 
such fantasy landscapes indicative of what Findlay describes as an inventive 
time.18  On the outskirts of Los Angeles, private developers oversaw the 
construction of the planned community of Lakewood.  Completed in 1953, 
Lakewood represented one of the first experiments in postwar suburban 
development.  Homing some 70,000 residents, publicist Don Rochlen referred to 
it as ǲǤǳ  Lakewood embodied a significant (albeit all white) 
mass-produced housing project, a Levittown of the West.  ǯ 
read Ǯǯǯ with realtors welcoming ǲ
suburban frontier.ǳ19  300 miles away at the Nevada Test Site, pioneers on the 
atomic frontier constructed the instant community of Doom Town.   
 
Assisted by the American Institute of Architects, 	Ǯival ǯ planning ideas. Doom Town resembled a scaled-down 
model of Lakewood.  It took only a few months to assemble. The sudden rise of 
Nevadaǯ model city mimicked the accelerated practices of construction 
pioneered at new suburban developments across the country, as well as the 
rapid changes taking place at nearby Las Vegas.  Providing housing for workers 
involved in the construction of Hoover Dam in the 1930s, Boulder City, just 
twenty miles from Vegas, stood as an earlier example of a model community.  
The latest conveyor belt mentality of home building perfectly suited the need for 
fast-tracked experimental projects at the Nevada Test Site.  Commentators noted 
the resemblance to the latest housing schemes, labeling Doom Town a ǲǳǲǡ
su ?Ǥ ? ?Ǥǳ20  At Doom Town, suburbia was assembled (then 
demolished) at record speed. 
 
Allusions to suburbia suited the remits of civil defense. As Andrew Grossman 
highlightsǡǲǳǲǳǤ	ǡǲ
meaning and security in a Ǥǳ21  The FCDA identified suburbia as ǯbest hope for survival in the event of nuclear attack. In a 1953 
report, the Administration identified 193 metropolitan areas Ǯǯ
for attack, concluding that most American cities would be lost in nuclear war.22  
In the desire to forge a ǲǡǳ settlements outside 
metropolitan areas became the ideal places ǲ
commonplacǳ post-war. 23  Associated with conformity, order, 
and a white majority, the emergent suburban landscape of the 1950s seemed 
very much in tune with FCDA values and the social conservatism of first director 
Millard Caldwell, who in his prior role as Governor of Florida had championed 
segregation and responded to the news of Japanese surrender in World War Two 
by requesting bars close early in fear of unwelcome ǲǤǳ24  The Ǯǯsuburbia, marked by controlled and predictable lives, 
allied well with the AǯǤ
FCDA officials also shrewdly recognized suburbanites as the new American 
majority, thus the most important catchment for both a civil defense message 
and long-term political support.  Suburbia represented the best place to sell 
FCDA propaganda, as well as the best location for shelters, evacuation routes and 
a new home front. Suburbia signified a stronger America able to withstand even 
nuclear attack. 
 
Suburbia symbolized survival; it also symbolized mass consumption.  As ǡǲǯǳǡtrue home of ǲǤǳ25  At Lakewood, the post-1945 dream included a Waste King Ǯǯ and Norge refrigerator at home, and a ǯȋǯȌ close by.  A reinforced delivery tunnel 
underneath the new Lakewood Center mall served as a fallout shelter for 6,000 
residents.  At Doom Town, messages of survival linked with modish ideas about 
consumer innovation and home gadgetry.  In Doom Town II, authorities tested a 
range of indoor shelters.  The FCDA promoted the nuclear shelter as another Ǯǯa new build, a natural extension of the suburban home.  FCDA officials 
appended civil defense to a growing discourse of home improvement, presenting 
the fallout shelter as an ideal project for the DIY enthusiast, not that far removed 
from a garden tree house.  Such an enclosed environment afforded a unique 
opportunity for family time and social intimacy. Rather than social disintegration 
coinciding with nuclear war, exactly the opposite effect would occur: the bomb 
would bring family together. The shelter epitomized suburban privacy. Such 
propaganda reached its zenith in 1959, when national press covered the first 
honeymoon held in a bomb shelter. 
 
By suburbanizing the bomb, the FCDA also presented it as a domestic threat, ǲǡǳ that a little DDT spray could make light work 
of. This tactic downplayed the danger. Guy Oakes remarkedǡǲ	[was] 
presented as if it were light snow descending onto this comfortable middle class Ǥǳ  Embracing civil defense equated to tackling a domestic pest.  The 
successful homemaker thus represented the ideal candidate to face off the 
nuclear peril.  Famous for her optimistic speeches, FCDA deputy director ǲǳ
saviors of the nation.26  Propaganda extended female homemaking duties of the 
1950s to encompass a Cold War role.  Hence, convenience television dinners 
seemed not that far from gathering stockpiles for survival, while keeping the 
house clean and tidy served as a way to avoid it burning down in the event of a 
nuclear explosion. Perfecting home chores and mastering nuclear attack aligned.  
As noted in the FCDA docuǮǡǯ the suburban 
home with freshly painted white picket fences and tidy backyard epitomized a ǮǯǤ Doom Town both exploited and strengthened such 
imagery.  
 
Consumption as Survival 
 
Atomic and consumer culture also aligned at Doom Town.  Product placement 
included all manner of automobiles, television sets and household tins.  In the 
official Operation Cue documentary, journalist Joan Collin highlighted the 
significance of ǲǳvisit to Doom 
Town II. The informational, consumer-based film had Collin ask questions about 
shelters and foodstuffs, while an off-screen male narrator provided the answers, 
often referencing corporate sponsorship.27   
 
Doom Town resembled a huge department store on the brink of Armageddon.  
Mall culture invaded the Nevada Test Site in the guise of a whole range of 
consumer products on display, including domestic appliances, home furnishing, 
lighting and wall art.  Similar to a quality control inspector, the FCDA set about 
testing the merchandise.  One press release announcedǡǲǡǳǲǤǳ The Venetian Blind Association of America selected 
the designs to test.28  Doom Town highlighted a new level of cooperation 
between the military-industrial complex and consumer-focused corporations, 
with the promise of survivability through a new era of atomically tuned 
merchandise. 
 
Pivotal to the survival of a post-war suburban population, food represented the Ǥǲǡǳ	 ? ?
food products for testing at Apple 2, with the aim of finding the best items to 
survive attack.29  A range of organizations including the National Association of 
Frozen Food Packers and Evaporated Milk Association sponsored the 
experiment.  In a period marked by the popularity of the home freezer and 
television dinner, the inclusion of food preservation tests at Doom Town testified 
to a new culture of preservation (and the hope of long-lasting products). The 
idea of food surviving past its natural lifespan by mass refrigeration could 
arguably be extended through and even beyond radioactive war.  Similar to a 
consumer tǡ	Ǯ	ǯ noted how the flavor ǡǲ-flavored gelatin, 
chocolate pudding, rice, macaroni, and oatmeal were cooked and tasted and Ǥǳ30  Within the public dimension of this discourse, the 
FCDA meshed surviving Armageddon with a culture of contemporary 
convenience and lengthy shelf-dates.  Ǯǯ 
on site implied Ǯǯwould likely survive any situation, with 
reporter Joan Collin enthusing over the quality of the beef.31 
 
The organization revived 
ǯǡ-stocking scheme 
used in World War Two, reinforcing ideas of the female at home as valued 
consumer. For Operation Cueǡ	ǡǲ
ǯǡǳ ? ?ǲǳ
stored (and exposed) in kitchens and shelters. Previously associated with natural ǡ	ǲ
ǯǡǤǳ32  The nuclear shelter took on 
the shape of one giant storehouse of culinary delights.  Pictures of rows of tins at 
the Doom Town houses attested to this aspect.   Nuclear survival connected with 
nostalgia for past schemes of storage, as well as contemporary fixations with 
copiousness. The home shelter reinforced a culture of abundance. 
 
Images of Cold War survival also linked with car advertising.  Highway 
construction campaigns of the 1950s situated the automobile as the ideal 
evacuation vehicle in disaster scenarios.  ǲ ? ?ǡǳFCDAǯǤ
Slaten Jenner explained to the press how cars served as invaluable civil defense 
toolǲǳfor study.33  Symptomatic of the new corporate-FCDA 
alliance, the car industry dutifully offered its assistance. Standard Oil provided 
gasoline, local garages from the National Automobile Dealers Association loaned 
their cars.  ǲroud of the patriotic response of the car dealers,ǳ the FCDA 
promised ringside views of the test and the return of vehicles for display 
purposes.34  DL Johnson of Johnson Bros. Chevrolet wroteǡǲ
my car regardless of the condition it might be in, even if I have to send a truck to Ǥǳ35  The Las Vegas Sun covered the story of 40 high school ǲ	ǳǤ36  At both Doom 
Towns, cars littered the atomic terrain. Harold Goodwin, FCDA Director of 
Operations hoped to not only learn how to deploy vehicles during nuclear attack, 
but how ǲǤǳ Goodwin related, ǲ
feeling that the automotive industry has a big stake in automobile behavior 
under atomic Ǥǳ37  The bomb promised better standards in road safety 
and brand quality.  As the New Mexican reported: ǲook forward to next ǯmobile advertisements telling us that the Super-Duper 8 absorbs less 
radiation per horsepower than any other model. Should be a great selling Ǥǳ38  Highlighting its faith in American engineering, the FCDA concluded that 
the US automobile could ǲǳwhen faced with the Soviet-designed 
bomb.39  A product of the Doom Town tests, the civil defense pampǮ ?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ-addiction and nuclear survival in equal 
measure. Corwin Willson, a Flint-based designer even created his own Ǯ-tour-ǯatomic survival vehicle.40  
 
Finally, placement of television sets in Doom Town residences underlined an 
event designed around media, advertising and the rise of visual culture. An 
estimated 70 percent of the population watched test Annie on their television 
setsǡǲǥǤǳ For Operation Cue, the FCDA 
arranged for NBC and ABC to cover the test, while 20th Century Fox gained the 
rights to produce a Ǯǯ later played in between 300 
and 500 theaters.  The Las Vegas Review-Journal enthused that: ǲǯ
expensive premier will be unfolded out on the Nevada desert Sunday, and 
nothing that Hollywood ever has proǤǳ The FCDA 
reported Operation Cue ǲǤǳ41 
 
Audio-visual technology helped mold disaster into popular entertainment.  The 
latest time-lapse photography depicted the frame-by-frame collapse of houses in 
Operation Doorstep in 1953.  The slow motion format almost suggested that the 
action could be paused, stopped or even rewound; the disaster controlled and 
directed. While the mushroom cloud could be viewed via the cathode ray tube, 
the inability of film to capture radioactive ions on screen cast the event as less 
serious.  Film limits thus suited the overall message of the FCDA:  to play down 
the radiation danger. 
 
Across the nation, Americans witnessed fabricated scenes of life and death at 
timber-framed abodes viewed through their wooden-framed television sets. 
Audiences consumed images of total destruction, episodes of nuclear war, as 
interrupts to I Love Lucy and The $64,000 Question.  They watched an early form Ǯreality tvǯ based around mannequins in survival town. While ABCǯǮǯ advertised an exciting new entertainment landscape in 
Anaheim, the FCDA marketed a new kind of atomic landscape in Nevada.  The 
screen served as a consumer filter on proceedings, with the FCDA providing a 
heavily mediated image.  Ǯ-ǯ the period, people peered 
in. 
 
Along with science ǡǲǳ, Doom Town 
contributed to a fresh narrative landscape that cast the bomb as consumer 
entertainment.  In nearby Las Vegas, a range of new hotel-casinos opened on the 
strip, including the Desert Inn, the Sahara, and the Sands that welcomed the 
atomic test series as a novel way to increase business. The Chamber of 
Commerce published a shot calendar for visitors, while individual casinos 
advertised their own atomic-themed pool parties and beauty pageants. 
Atomic culture swept the town.  One reporter noticed how ǲǤǳ42  Treating the military site as a satellite of the 
fast-expanding gambling business, casino proprietors advertised the atomic 
series as a gratis firework display, while, as Eugene Moehring and Michael Green 
explain, local pǲviewed the spectacular aboveground tests as another 
spur to development.ǳ43  Scheduled for late April 1955, Doom Town II joined a ǡǯǡ-
Nino Valdes prizefight as competing attractions for tourists on the strip.  The Las 
Vegas Sun ǲǤǳ44 The delay 
of the test frustrated hotel staff that had already allocated room bookings based 
around the multiple events. ǲǳ, 
Copa showgirl Linda Lawson emerged at the Sands Hotel crowned Ǯ-Cue,ǯ 
complete with mushroom cloud hat (Lawson went on to a successful film 
career).45  Miscues aside, Doom Town aligned well with the Vegas-ization of the 
bomb, strengthening the growing sense of nuclear testing as a source of novelty 
and consumer interest. 
 
The FCDA mannequins out in the desert ultimately signified the same thing as 
pink flamingos on picket-fenced lawns across suburbia and Vegas Vic waving at 
casino guests: statements of American consumer culture and entertainment 
edifice. The time-lapse photography and instant boom and bust of Doom Town 
squared with a new postwar world of high technology and speedy reinvention.  A ǲǡǳBetter Homes and Gardens 
titled it, was equally a time of the push button to Armageddon.  There seemed 
little to separate the wealth of new technologies.  Even the nomenclature was ǤǮǯ
household convenience.46 
 
Dioramas of the Cold War 
 
Such consumer labels operated within an underlying Cold War framework.  In a  ? ? ? ?ǮǯRiesman declared the Cold 
War a conflict of symbols of consumption. Riesman described a fictitious 
bombing of the Soviet Union with consumer goods triumphing the American ǢǮǤǯ  Operation 
Doorstep and Cue represented Ǯǯ of this offensive, and the advent 
of a militarized consumer landscape.  The model homes at Doom Town followed 
the same kind of logic.47  
 
Showcased on home television and across newspaper front pages, Doom Town 
functioned as a very public Cold War exhibit.  	ǯ
Hirsch revealed, ǲs of Ǥǳ48  Doom Town joined Ǯǯ
the period.  ǯ	Ǯǯigh technology fuelled by 
capitalist development. At the Century 21 Exposition in Seattle 1952, visitors Ǯǯ Ǯǯǡ a fallout 
shelter for the welcoming image of Marilyn Monroe.  At the consumer 
playground of Disneyland, the Monsanto-Ǯ 	ǡǯ Ǯǯicrowave and ultra-sonic 
dishwasher. Talk of energy too cheap to meter, nuclear-powered kitchen toasters 
and high technology worlds situated the future as consumer-based and nuclear-
engineeredǤǯwhite picket fences as well 
as the turning of swords into ploughshares and pruning shears. 
 
Placing American goods in the face of Soviet aggression, the Doom Town 
experiment shared much in common with Ǯǯ 
showcased at the American Exhibition in July 1959, held at Sokoliniki Park, 
Moscow.  The Exhibition displayed the best of American consumption, and like ǡǡǲǡǡǡ
clothesǥǤǳ Both exhibit and townscape featured the 
latest lifestyles, fashions, food, kitchens, gadgets, and automobiles of the period.  
While Sokoliniki featured 22 of the latest US manufactured cars, Doom Town 
featured 51. Both exhibits pandered to the sensibilities of affluent, white middle 
class families. They functioned as propaganda landscapes, selling the American 
dream as the epitome of freedom through consumer choice.  Offered as 
aspirational living, both models attesteǲǤǳ  Elaine ǲǥa powerful weapon in Cold War 
propaganda arsenal,ǳ a tool deployed both at home and abroad. The same kind of 
branded goods made their way to both the USSR and Doom Town, consumer 
products enrolled in fighting the Cold War diplomatically and on the imagined 
battlefield of the home front.49   
 
The American Exhibition and Doom Town also functioned as landscapes of 
conflict. Looking across the consumer divide at Sokoliniki, President Richard 
Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev debated the relative merits of capitalist 
and communist systems.  They sparred over kitchen appliances as opposed to 
nuclear devices. Their exchange of consumer-based words as opposed to 
plutonium-based weapons highlighted the Cold War as a consumer war, with 
home ownership and quality of life key areas of conflict.  Confident in US 
domestic superiority, Nixon jousted, ǲǫǳ On a visit to 
California, Nikita Khrushchev later quipped about rockets being secretly hidden 
at Disneyland.  Together, the items at Sokolinikiǡǲǯ
icons, the things everybody thought about first when that lifestyle came under ǡǳ cherished way of life. Doom Town equally modeled 
the success of America.  It provided a powerful symbol of what could be won in 
the Cold War.  Both exhibits functioned as time capsules of successful capitalism, 
with a ticking time bomb placed alongside them, to foster appreciation and 
protection.50  
 
Much of the media interest in Doom Town surrounded its detailed recreation of 
American life.  Attention focused most of all on its residents scattered across the 
town site in a variety of poses.  On a basic level, the Doom Town mannequins 
served as signifiers of the American populace, fiberglass facsimiles of home 
dwellers. Cast in a range of domestic settings, the residents of Doom Town 
looked and even behaved akin to their real-life suburban counterparts. They 
dined, partied and hid from Armageddon.  On a scientific level, the dressed 
mannequins provided the FCDA with information on the best textiles for 
survival, data subsequently passed onto the clothing industry as part of the 
government/corporate nuclear relationship.  On an instructional level, the 
dummies highlighted shelter opportunities in the home and survival basics. The 
in-animation of the dummies led to the classic FCDA warning, ǲwill you, just 
like a mannequin, sit and wait.ǳ  JC Penney featured the civil defense tagline in 
their store advertising.51  
 
The FCDA used the dummies to advertise American freedom, individualism and 
self-reliance through consumer choice. Designed with the department store in 
mind, post-war mannequins existed in the marketplace with a purpose to sell.  At 
Doom Town, they entered a new realm of merchandising.  Part of the furniture of 
an atomic suburbia, the Doom Town dummies wore the latest fashions and Ǯǯ.  They functioned as potent symbols not just of 
people, but of consumption too.  The nuclear mannequins functioned as colorful 
avatars of the American economy. Mannequins in shop windows served as 
cyphers or placeholders: people looked in and saw themselves in new clothes. 
Likewise, thanks to the mannequins, Americans visualized themselves in the 
homes of Doom Town. 
 
It was specifically the mannequins manufactured by DG Williams that served as 
the ambassadors and foot-soldiers of 1950s American capitalism in commercial 
exhibitions in the USSR and, crucially, in Doom Town. These new, post-war 
dummies displayed none of the austerity or down beat expressions of their 
Depression-era or wartime counterparts.  They instead sported fresh smiles, 
oozed femininity and extravagance, and sold new clothing ranges, epitomized in ǯ.  Louisa Larocci ǲǤǳ
-
styǯ	. Doom 
Town resembled a scaled up store window, an atomic diorama to rival ǯ
best window dressing. LA Darling Company of Michigan provided the 
mannequins for the atomic townscapes.  Treating them like department store 
models, JC Penney dressed each dummy in the latest clothing at a cost of over 
$2500. Clothes transformed the Doom Town mannequins into individuals with 
personality.  Evidence that style and fashion came above any experimental 
purpose, one 1955 model, placed next to a larder, even wore a bikini (at least on 
some level a fitting garment given its link to nuclear history).  Combining fear 
with fashion, JC Penney used the Doom Town mannequins to advertise its wares.  
The department store warned of being unprepared for nuclear attack ȋǲ
mannikins could have been live people, in fact, they ǨǳȌǡ
while equally highlighting how ǲmannequins dressed alike.ǳ For the retail 
corporation, the bomb provided a fresh advertising opportunity.  In the article ǲ
mic Bomb Sale ǡǳ Las Vegas store manager Hillman R. Lee 
related how the fabrics tested at Doom Town might also prove ǲ
in deciding fashion Ǥǳ  Another press article told of how ǲeties of American clothing, excepting a mink coat, have been 
placed on the mannequinsǥǤǳ52  
 The connection between the Doom Town dummies and their department store 
origins continued after the tests, with the return of mannequin survivors (40 out 
of 50 in Operation Doorstep) to LA ǲepartment 
stores.ǳ  Manufactured celebrities of the nuclear age, the Doom Town 
mannequins first went on display in Jǯstore just two weeks 
after test Annie before being paraded in Los Angeles and other cities. As if 
Marilyn Monroe blond bombshells of atomic culture, the mannequins perfectly 
captured the artificial beauty of the age, the neon and the nuclear.53 
 
In many ways, the mannequins of Doom Town resembled the audio-animatronic 
residents of Disneyland--another simulacra of American life cast in anodyne, 
even clinical detail.  Dummies populated the two environments: the key ǯǡ
mushroom cloud shifted limbs.  Working with inflexible forms, the FCDA ǡǮǯ
dining, driving and ducking for cover, some taking shelter from the blast, others 
left out in the open.  The presence of artificial residents at both places completed 
the picture of American life, but also gave the landscapes a fantastical, unreal 
quality: an almost surreal aesthetic. 
  
The well-dressed, anatomically identical mannequins also reminded of 
stereotypical images of clean-dressed men and women in 1950s advertising, of 
the Ǯǯdescribed by William H. Whyte and the homely Ǯ
goddessǯ.  Urbanist Lewis Mumford critiqued the sameness of American life in 
the 1950s, ǲǡnidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at 
uniform distances, on uniform roads, on a treeless communal waste, inhabited by ǡǡǤǳ Like American 
advertising of grey-flannel suited men of the day, the Doom Town dummies all 
looked roughly the same. Their plastic smiles reflected a suspected façade of 
contentment in the period identified by Betty Friedan and David Riesman. The 
FCDA documentary for Operation Cue highlighted superficial damage to the 
clothing of Doom Town resǡǲǳǲcharred and fadedǥouter layer of his ǡǳ but the real superficiality 
lay within.54 
 
Placed in everyday rituals such as mealtime and evening television, the Doom 
Town mannequins reinforced the notion of the 1950s nuclear family and its 
consumer lifestyle.  A voguish term coined in 1947, the nuclear family not just 
described a two child family, but carried with it connotations of American pride, 
material wealth and success.  Associating Doom Town with the nuclear family 
linked the experiment with one of the most powerful labels of the period. Doom 
Town paralleled other popular advertising in the period, as corporations rushed 
to exploit the family image to sell everything from Oldsmobile cars to new 
kitchen appliances.  At the Nevada Test Site, a mannequin man in a grey flannel 
suit, accompanied by a plastic housewife, and two quiet children, effectively 
visualized the nuclear family ideal. The government agency attempted to sell 
both the nuclear family and its postwar survival, forging a backstory to the 
township and hoping that the nation would watch with empathy and emotional 
investment.  In press coverage, Doom Town residents went by the names of Mr. 
and Mrs. America and the Darling family.  Life seemed representative and 
everyday. The San Antonio Express ǲǯHappy Familyǯ Awaits A-ǡǳ
describing, ǲǥǡǯǤǳOn a deeper level, Doom Town contributed to an ongoing dialogue over 
the meaning of the nuclear family in the Cold War period. Elaine Tyler May 
defined the ǲǣǡ
sexually charged, cushioned by abundance, and protected against impending 
doom by the wonders of modern Ǥǳogether and 
tested such notions of isolation, abundance and protection.55 
 Ǯǯ and suburban living, Doom Town 
amounted to an impressive consumer spectacle.  The mannequin consumers of 
Doom Town complemented the increasing commerciality of period atomic 
culture.  Similar to mannequins in store windows, Doom Town was part of the Ǯǯof the bomb in the 1950sǡǮǯ.  Incorporating 
the bomb into a framework of consumption, the FCDA sold the atom as 
something every American could relate to.  It attempted to insert the bomb into 
everyday consumer life. It also allied Doom Town (and with it, broader civil 
defense) with a specific consumer narrative of the bomb: victory through 
purchase.  Along with other propaganda pieces of the period, at Doom Town the 
FCDA suggested that by being a good consumer, you could survive attack.  With 
the right choice of freshly built suburban homes, fallout shelters, the latest cars, 
textiles and fashions, Americans could buy survival.  The consumer world could 
actively save lives. Civil defense appeared a product on sale.  As if a statement of 
faith in American consumption, 	ǯKatherine Howard kept a dinner 
plate and cookbook from the debris of the 1953 Doom Town, offering them to ǲǤǳ56   Mementos of 
Armageddon, the plate and cookbook testified to a consumer world capable of 
outlasting radioactive decay.  Consumer America seemed stronger than the 
Soviet A-bomb.  
 
Destroying the Consumer Spectacle 
 
After constructing Doom Town as a simulacrum of American consumer life, the 
FCDA then blew it up.  In reports to Congress, Operation Doorstep and Cue were 
offered as highlights of the Civil Defense programme.  According to Caldwell, ǲǥwas greatly stǳ.  Doom Town I ǲǳto the American public ǲǳ
bomb ǲ,ǳwhile the 1955 test underlined the need to act, thatǡǲ
what an atomic explosion can do, many more Americans were awakened to the 
critical need for civil defense preparedness.ǳ57  
 
However, the much-anticipated home front never materialized.  ǲ
were told to turn their imagination of doom into mental readiness, to transform 
their feaǡǳMcEnaney.58 Val Peterson labeled Doom Town ǲǳǤ59  Instead inaction dominated.  
The destruction of model America failed to motivate Americans to act.  As 
Garrison claims, ǲivil Defense propaganda was a massive failed federal effort to 
control public perception,ǳ with Doom Town just another example of 
disappointment.60  Captioning photographs of a Doorstep building, the FCDA ǡǲans learned from these pictures,ǳ but questions 
remained over what exactly they learned.61  Meant to test hypotheses about 
survivability during nuclear attack, Doom Town failed to offer clear guidance 
over what to do, and instead bred hopelessness.  Rated against the original brief 	ǡǮǡǯǡfoster ǮǡǯǮǢǯǮǡǯ more a failure 
than a victory.  ǲǳǲǳpublic 
sector, Doom Town more likely added to it.62  Critical of the event, civil defense 
director for Illinois General Robert M. Woodward dismissed Operation Cue as a ǲǳǲǳǲǳ
to the home front.63  
 
The consumer angle contributed to the Ǯǯ message. 
Most obviously, Doom Town depicted the total destruction of the consumer 
dream and left questions over whether anyone or anything could survive nuclear 
attack.  Cameras captured frame by frame the obliteration of buildings.  
Newspapers catalogued the damage. The Albuquerque Journal described how the 
Apple 2 detonation, ǲ
like a monsǡǳ no survivors, while at Annie, a ǯ to be found 7 miles out.64  Meant to visualize 
themselves as Doom Town dummies, audiences witnessed the loss of picket 
fences, suburban homes, and the 1950s dream. 
 
While across the state border, Disneyland insulated its visitors from nuclear 
threat, the explosion at Doom Town in Nevada provided a rude interruption to 
the consumer bliss of the period.  The FCDA underlined the atom as an uninvited 
guest, ruining the ǲ the dining room of the 
house at 7,500 feet from ground zeroǤǳ
living in the 1950s, the FCDA placed the nuclear family perilously on the brink of 
Armageddon at Doom Town.   ǲaware of ǡǳǣǲǤǳǣǲǯ
Crockett would have been sǤǳ65  
 
Watching the disaster unfold, most Americans felt powerless.  As the FCDA 
annual report for 1955 noted, ǲǡǳǲǤǳ66 At 35 
kiloton rather than 10 megaton, Apple 2 pǮǯxplosion compared 
to a real scenario, but American Legion member Mrs. Rae Ashton from Bountiful, 
Utah ǣǲǡǳǲǯǤǳ  Even Val Peterson confided, ǲ
was on top of a Ǥǳ67  Images of a wrecked suburban 
landscape questioned the idea of survival offered by the FCDA.  The FCDA 
booklet Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍpreached, ǲǡǳǲ chances of making a complete recovery are much the same as Ǥǳom Town far from resembled an everyday accident.   
 The scale of destruction also highlighted the ineffectiveness of Ǯǯto 
soften an attack. Even the FCDA privately acknowledged the limited protection 
afforded by household consumer items.  One technical report ǲ ? ?ǡ
the blast. Top severely dished, some windows broken, hood blown open. The 
mannequin driver had a crushed headǤǳ68  Rather than backing four-wheels to 
survival, Doom Town functioned more as an auto-geddon landscape.  Spectators ǯǡǯǡ
the atomic bomb. Reflecting growing skepticism toward nuclear testing, the 
press underlined the negative imagery, especially at Operation Cue.  The 
Wyoming Eagle mused, ǲ
destroy instantly thousands of persons, buildings, and belongings, and leave no 
trace of their existencǤǳ69 Starting out as a symbol of the good life, Doom Town 
turned into a powerful metaphor of loss.  
 
The relationship between bomb, media and consumption thus took on narrative 
directions that the FCDA failed to manage or predict. Doom Town undermined 
the dominant paradigms of the era.  Its destruction showed how easily the 
consumer gains of the period might disappear.  The FCDA experiment 
highlighted the fragility of the consumer dream. It showed an unwelcome 
vulnerability embedded in materialism.  At the American Exhibition, Khrushchev 
challenged Nixon over the benefits of capitalism, claiming that American 
products were simply not mean to last.  At Doom Town, the American consumer 
world dissolved in a matter of seconds.  The bomb consumed everything.  
 
Doom Town failed ǲȏȐǳ	
and the press.70  It reinforced images from Hiroshima and Nagasaki that 
projected the bomb as an instrument of total destruction.  The FCDA replaced a 
bomb exploding over a Japanese city with a mushroom cloud hanging over a 
partly vaporized American suburbia.  The press contributed to the creative 
process, packaging Doom Town into a homegrown ǮǡǯǮshǤǯ  Touring the 1953 site, news reporter Elton Fay felt the eerie quality of 
Doom Town: ǲǥǡǤǤǳ71 The Los Angeles 
Times labeled Doom Town II a ǲǤǳ72  Like the radioactive monster 
movies of the period, television showed dummies coming out of the desert 
mutated and scary.  The second Doom Town even coincided with the release of 
the B-movie Them!  The mannequins themselves morphed into totems of nuclear 
horror.  They denoted the visual power in the disfigurement process of the 
bomb. Bodies lay in distorted, disturbing and unnatural poses. The voyeuristic 
interest in Doom Town events contributed to a growing fascination with 
destruction in the Cold War popular psyche.  Rather than buying into civil 
defense, Americans watched Doom Town as Ǯ ǯǤ 
 
The Civil Defense Paradox 
 
Doom Town ultimately highlighted the flawed approach of the FCDA to civil 
defense.  Since inception, the Administration had approached the task by selling Ǯǯ to the American public, publishing scenarios of death alongside 
reassuring statements of survival.  The FCDA reprinted and distributed Look 
magazineǯǲǯǳ while also promising 
survival with Bert the Turtle.73  Similarly, the FCDA aimed with Doom Town to ǲǡǳyet 
equally Ǯǯ.74  Placed together at the same physical 
location, the two impulses (and messages) could not be reconciled.  Captured in 
the San Antonio newspaper headline ǲǯ	ǯ-ǳ
sense of extremes and contradictions, of perfect 1950s consumer bliss giving 
way to Armageddon.  The suburban idyll composed at the beginning of the Doom 
Town experiment seemed at complete loggerheads with the broken cars at its 
the end. The FCDA furnished its own visual paradox, and contributed to its own 
failure to secure a workable national defense programme.     
 
Adding a consumer dimension only heightened the confusion, and thwarted 
FCDA success. The traditional Cold War message of the 1950s was strength 
through consumer goods.  Material abundance equated with victory.  Yet at 
Doom Town, the consumer world was found wanting.  Broken appliances and 
overturned vehicles equated with failure. Pictures high in social realism depicted 
the nuclear family dismembered.  With Operation Alert, a simulated attack on US 
soil in 1954 (scheduled between Operation Doorstep and Operation Cue), the 	ǲ-attack scenario that featured white, middle-class, 
suburban families, all exceedingly clean, emerging from the holocaust with calm ǡǡǤǳ75 At Doom Town, 
the post-attack scenario looked very different in composition: mutated and 
deformed mannequins emerging bewildered and disheveled.  The FCDA 
contradicted its own message. 
 
Ironically a town populated with plastic mannequins provided too much realism 
to handle.  The fake Doom Town residents made the Cold War seem too tangible 
and vividǤ	ǲ
atomic attack, planners needed to create a vivid but not horrific snapshot of what 
one would look like in order to create a psychological climate that facilitated self-Ǥǳ76  The New York Times rightly ǣǲ
the frightfulness and awesome destructive powers of the A bomb. But could not 
this emphasis tend to promote an almost fatalistic attituǫǳ77  The Portsmouth 
Times likewise raised the issue of fatalism shaping American views of the atom 
(which it labeled Ǯ-ǯ).78  WǮǯDoom Town 
dummies, the FCDA went too far in forging a ǮǯǤ As one 
witness in the 	ǲe watches the A bombǳ explained, ǳ
saw a stairway to HǥǤǳ79  Rather than a Civil Defense 
booster, Doom Town provided a route towards disaffection with the bomb. It 
provided an early example of ǮǯǮǯ, and an 
image of doom difficult to feel positively about. 
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